Abstract Given any allocation of parliament seats among parties, we characterize all the stable government configurations (supported by at least a majority of the parliament) in terms of winning coalitions and policy outcomes. We consider a two dimensional policy space and we assume that there are four parties that care mainly about holding office, and only instrumentally about policy. We find that for any distribution of seats in the parliament only two scenarios are possible: either there is a party that is a member of almost all equilibrium coalitions (dominant party scenario) or there is a party that is never a member of an equilibrium coalition (dominated party scenario). We characterize the key party for each possible scenario and we show that it is sufficient that the key party has intense preferences over one the issues to guarantee the formation of a stable government coalition.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We try to understand how a given electoral result leads to the formation of a governing coalition. Our predictions are described by a coalition of parties supported by a majority of votes, and a policy supported by the parties in the coalition. We characterize all stable government configurations in terms of coalitions and policies.
There are different spatial models of legislative choice that seek to describe or predict how individual legislators make collective choices, and the model we present belongs to this literature. Our contribution is an extension of the analysis E. Aragonès (B) Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain e-mail: enriqueta.aragones@uab.cat of government formation in a parliamentary democracy to a multi-dimensional policy space. Krehbiel (1988) states that "expanding the dimensionality of the choice space from one to two has profoundly disequilibrating consequences." The main problem with a two dimensional space in a voting game is the potential for voting cycles and chaos, as predicted by McKelvey (1976) chaos theorem.
Following an important part of the literature we will use the concept of the core, borrowed from cooperative game theory, as a measure of stability [see, for instance, Moulin (1988) or Myerson (1990) ]. This assumption is particularly relevant when we consider the formation of the coalition that sustains an executive in office on the basis of a confidence vote. The members of this coalition consume all the benefits of office-holding, and have the control of all policy outputs. There is no binding agreement in this coalition: a non-confidence motion may be proposed at any time.
Plott (1967) describes the particular conditions under which there is a nonempty 'core' in two dimensional voting games. In the legislative bargaining model that we present the non-empty core conditions are satisfied for a large range of parameter values. These conditions guarantee the formation of a stable governing coalition.
We consider purely opportunistic parties, that is, parties that value their office holding in the present and in future legislatures. We assume that voters are ideological, that is, they care about the policies implemented. When facing ideological voters, parties that care about holding office today and also about holding office in future legislatures, may decide not to accept a proposal to join a governing coalition if it implies the implementation of a policy that is too different from their ideal point. The reason is that by compromising their policy position in the present they might jeopardize their vote support in future elections. That is, parties will be concerned with their policy positions only to the extend that this helps them to win elections.
We represent the parties payoffs in a reduced form by assuming that parties care about holding office and instrumentally about the policy implemented. The value that a party attaches to holding office today, that is, how much they are willing to give up on policy preferences today, can be though as determined by the party preferences for holding office in the future. Alternatively, one can think of the value for holding office as an individual rationality constraint for the party: it represents the maximal amount of utility that it is willing to give up in terms of policy. A party that attaches a large value to holding office will be willing to commit to policies far away from its ideal point in order to guarantee becoming a member of the winning coalition.
We assume complete party discipline, that is, we assume that all members of a party share the same policy preferences. Therefore, we define the preferences and actions of a given party as representing the preferences and actions of all its members.
We focus our analysis on a two dimensional policy space and we assume that there are four parties. We endow these parties with flexible relative intensity of preferences between issues: their indifference curves with respect to policies are not circles but rather ellipses.
